

STAGING SHAME:  
CONSTRUCTING *AISCHUNĒ* IN MENANDER'S *SAMIA* AND *DYSKOLOS*

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES AND CLASSICS

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

WITH A MAJOR IN CLASSICS

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2019


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
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## ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the Greek notion of *aischunē* as represented in Menander's *Samia* and *Dyskolos*. The term *aischunē* conveys an emotion, a disposition, and an ethical code related to the concepts of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and dis/honor. I argue that *aischunē* cannot map directly onto any modern concept, but by analyzing how and why characters express *aischunē* in Menander's family dramas, we can more fully understand the social frameworks underlying it and begin to understand how the emotion felt.

Because part of *aischunē* is an expression of an emotion, Chapter 1 deals with emotional theory, how one can conduct a study into the history of emotions. Building on decades of interdisciplinary research, I argue that emotions are at least partially socially constructed, and, to study *aischunē*, one must investigate the constructs. I then lay out working definitions of three modern American emotional constructs—shame, guilt, and embarrassment—which are necessary touchstones to talk about ancient *aischunē*. Finally, I distinguish *aischunē* from *aidōs*, both of which denote sorts of shame/guilt/honor. In Chapter 2 and 3, I analyze each instance of *aischunē* in Menander's *Samia* and *Dyskolos*, and I argue for a different translation to better convey complexities of meaning in each case.

# INTRODUCTION

Weeds that hide the fallen dead,  
Time that nullifies a name,  
Will not bury shame.  
—Marion Strobel, “Shame” (1931)

Are emotions transhistorical? The question is simple to pose, but its implications are profoundly destabilizing. Anger, joy, shame, and the like seem to be emotions essential to the human condition and likewise seem to manifest themselves across time and cultural boundaries, but one must ask: to what extent are these emotions innate, and to what extent socially constructed? In Strobel’s poem, the speaker meditates on shame’s permanence, its historical endurance, but how does our reading of the poem change if Strobel’s understanding of shame is not our own?

The stakes of the debate are particularly high for classicists. It is a paradox of the discipline that classical texts seem simultaneously familiar and foreign to readers. The plays and poems, histories and novels of antiquity are products of an alien culture, but at the same time express something fundamentally human which has drawn new students and readers for millennia. It is easy but misleading to take emotions for granted as a human-constant in these texts. As so much else of antiquity, the emotions expressed in its texts may be recognizable to us, but they are nevertheless alien.

While a concise definition of “emotion” is still elusive, new advances in neurobiology support the hypothesis that emotions are in part contextually determined, that biology creates a frame filled by social interaction. In response, studies of ancient emotions have blossomed in parallel with the development of the “History of Emotions” across disciplines.<sup>1</sup> These studies

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<sup>1</sup> The following works provide overviews of the development of the History of Emotions and useful starting places: for history of Greek emotions, see Konstan (2006, 2015, and 2016); Chaniotis (2012a, 2012b); Cairns (2008, 2015, 2016); Cairns and Damien (2016). For Roman see Toohey (2004) and Kaster (2005). A more extensive bibliography can be found in Kaster (2006: 1-5, 1, 2nn).

confront the changing social values and relationships behind emotions to better define and understand how it has felt to be a human through time.

Building upon this emerging trend, this study aims to complicate our understanding of one particular ancient emotion, *aischunē*, as it is represented in Menander's two most complete comedies, *Samia* and *Dyskolos*. *aischunē* is regularly rendered as "shame" (or one's "sense of shame"), "guilt," "honor," "respect," "reverence," or some interaction of these forces. This investigation will show that, while these are all expedient preliminary translations, *aischunē* is in fact an emotion and disposition with no real English equivalent; it is an entity (at least in part) socially constructed, reliant on context and culture that no longer exist.

This work was inspired by D.L. Cairns's *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (1993). Cairns' word-study explores the variegated meanings of the term *aidōs*, a concept related to honor and shame that is intimately connected with *aischunē*, in ancient Greek epic and tragedy. Subsequent studies of Greek emotion in general and shame in particular have largely overlooked ancient comedy, or made only passing reference to Aristophanes within more substantive discussions of other authors.<sup>2</sup> Thus I extend this focus here to Menander's corpus.

Carefully analyzing the concept *aischunē* will bring us closer to seeing how the colors of antiquity's emotional palette differ from our own and help us contextualize the webs of social relations in which those emotions are embedded. In short, it will help us to appreciate how the ancients felt. *aischunē* is not guilt, nor shame, nor modesty, but can encompass any of those

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<sup>2</sup> Similarly, N.R.E. Fisher's (1992) discusses the permutations of Greek *hybris* as shame in epic, tragedy, and philosophy. Exceptional are Dutsch and Konstan (2011) who discuss women's emotion in New Comedy, primarily focused on anger. Munteanu (2011:2) poses the question: "does genre influence the way in which emotions are presented in a literary text, and thus the way in which we understand them? ... Ought our understanding of ancient 'anger' to depend on whether we are reading Euripides or Menander?" Most of the authors of the subsequent chapters answer yes, to some extent, hence the necessity of studying genre-specific emotion or undertaking comparative analyses.

feelings. As we start to appreciate *aischunē*'s specificity and essential foreignness, we can denaturalize what is familiar to us and begin to more clearly see how our own messy and complex emotional constructions like “guilt” and “shame” work.

Before examining Menander, we need to establish what exactly an emotion is, especially in classical scholarship. The stakes here are high and the arguments numerous, but I will trace the outlines of the debate to establish the theoretical underpinnings of my work. It will then be useful to lay out working definitions of “shame” and “guilt” as we currently understand them, as well as “embarrassment.” Again, while none of these feelings is the same as *aischunē*, establishing English terminology is vital before discussing ancient feelings. Finally, it is necessary to briefly discuss the related Greek concept of *aidōs* and then, with the theoretical groundwork established, we proceed to textual investigation.

When we do not elide the differences between emotional states and carefully analyze how feelings have changed over time, we can appreciate more fully the poetic products of vastly different cultures and meditate more deeply on the underlying question of humanistic inquiry: what it means—and what it has meant—to be a human.

## CHAPTER 1: How Do We Feel?

If one should seek to name each particular one of [the emotions] of which the human heart is the seat, it is plain that the limit to their number would lie in the introspective vocabulary of the seeker, each race of men having found names for some shade of feeling which other races have left undiscriminated.

William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), p. 485.

### Emotion Theory

We must begin from uncertainty. There is no unanimous, interdisciplinary definition of “emotion.”<sup>3</sup> Rather, the word “emotion,” along with the related terms “sentiment,” “feeling,” “affect,” and “passion” have been imprecisely wielded and poorly defined across different fields of study.

Thanks to new efforts in neuroscience and genetic research of the last few decades,<sup>4</sup> impressively synthesized in recent years by historians of emotion, we can establish a useful working definition of emotion.<sup>5</sup> We must first abandon the strict universalist/constructivist dyad with which this paper began: rather than arguing for social construction of emotion against innate, essential, transhuman emotions, it is more fruitful to discuss to what degree emotions are both natural and contextually dependent.

Thus an emotion is a perceived change in one’s mental state, both felt physically and rationalized intellectually, and comprising any number of corporeal feelings alongside one’s understandings of his or her situation. The process of rationalization requires contextual

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<sup>3</sup> For an overview of the debate, see recent history of emotions handbooks, e.g. Boddice (2018); Rosenwein and Christiani (2018); Plamper (2015). Ben-Ze’ev’s (2001: 1-78) description over the controversy of defining “emotion,” while a bit out of date, is still eminently readable, thoughtful, and useful. For a linguist’s discussion of uses of the term, especially with regards to classics, see Theodoropoulou (2012: 433-69). Russel (2012) specifically discusses how the word “emotion” is defined across genres. Wilce (2009) explores how language affects emotion. Kagan (2007: 23) offers a useful definition, particularly with an eye towards neuroscientific scholarship on emotion, but quotes Wittgenstein to remind the reader that “meaning of a word is whatever a community agrees on” (41 n. 41). Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) trace ninety-two distinct definitions of “emotion” across disciplines from 1872-1980. Goldie (2009) provides an overview of recent scholarship on emotional theory in philosophy.

<sup>4</sup> In particular, see Knickmeyer *et al.* (2008); Glantz *et al.* (2007).

<sup>5</sup> A process begun in history departments by Stearns and Stearns (1985), having since grown across disciplines; see Boddice (2018: 48) for a brief overview.



understanding, and changes over time, just as physical sensations of emotions can vary according to cultural and societal norms. I will describe further how I derived this definition, but it is useful to establish it up front. My definition follows most closely work done by classicists David Konstan and Douglas Cairns,<sup>6</sup> as well as historians Rob Boddice (2018), Jerome Kagan (2007), and David Gross (2006).

The developing notion of “bioculturalism” (how our existence as biological beings is shaped by cultural factors) is helping us to see that we cannot discuss nature versus nurture, but rather must discuss the two forces in concert (Boddice 2018: 199; Gross 2006: 29-36). To quote Maria Theodoropoulou (2012: 437), a linguist who focuses on emotional terminology and expression, “biology creates a frame which each culture fills with its own details.”<sup>7</sup>

From observing human brains by MRI, we can be relatively certain that we all experience specific and discernable reactions in our amygdala when shown certain stimuli (Kagan 2007: 24). In other words, the brain physically reacts to stimuli. All humans and many animals share these innate biological reactions, visible in an MRI exam. These reactions, which I will call impulses, in turn trigger physical feelings, such as increased body temperature, horripilation (goose bumps), shivers, or other bodily sensations (Cairns 2013, 2015). Konstan (2015) prefers to call these feelings “affects” or—borrowing a fitting term from the ancient Stoics—*propatheia*, “pre-” or “proto-emotion.”<sup>8</sup> These are quasi-instinctive, subconscious experiences that affect our bodies.


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<sup>6</sup> Konstan (2003, 2006, 2015, 2016) and Cairns (1993, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2016).

<sup>7</sup> Theodoropoulou here cites Kovecses (2000, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> See also Parrott’s (2012: 247-8) discussion of “Ur-emotion.”

The human body can experience a wide variety of feelings, and similar feelings are present across cultures and times. However, it has proven extremely difficult to link observable neurologic reactions, impulses, with *consistent* physical feelings. In other words, while humans all have certain observable neurological impulses that trigger feelings, and while humans seem to have the capacity to feel the same feelings, the same impulses have *not* been shown to trigger the same feelings across time and place. To summarize, first the brain experiences an amygdalar impulse, and that impulse triggers a feeling or affect.



Disagreement stems from whether these impulses and feelings can be called emotion. Some evolutionary biologists contend that they are, most famously Antonio Demasio and Paul Elkman, who popularized modern “Affect Theory.” Affect Theory, or AT, is the idea that there are x number of basic emotions,<sup>9</sup> and these base emotions all correspond with specific facial expressions across all human communities which can be traced back to cranial impulses.<sup>10</sup> Despite its widespread popularity, Affect Theory has been roundly criticized in the academy.<sup>11</sup> Not only have we been unable to link certain neurological, amygdalar impulses with consistent facial expressions, we have also seen that the same stimuli do not necessarily produce the same affects in exposed parties.<sup>12</sup> For instance, the same image of a spider that makes one viewer grow

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<sup>9</sup> For Elkman (1995), who remains more influential and whose theories are known in pop culture, the number is six: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise.

<sup>10</sup> Kalimtzis (2012) brought AT into classics, specifically in discussing anger as a transhistorical emotion *qua human*. For critiques of Kalimtzis’ theory, see Konstan (2015).

<sup>11</sup> For a sustained critique, see Gross (2006: 29-39); for an overview, see Boddice (2018: 111-13).

<sup>12</sup> Boddice (2018: 48) gives a summary of related studies.

pale could make another redden—and neither color change is necessarily associated with one specific, named emotion. So again, a neurobiological impulse causes an affect, and while these impulses exist throughout human communities, they do not come about as results of the same stimuli, nor are they consistently considered to be indicative of the same emotion.

In fact, most recent evidence suggests that these affects can be trained and changed, according to the developing notion of “brain plasticity” (Glantz *et al* 2007; Knickmeyer *et al* 2008). In short, plasticity is the notion that our brains physically change to adapt to different environments, thus causing the same impulse to trigger different affects.

Finally, we must break from the modern notion that there is a split between “emotionality” and “rationality.”<sup>13</sup> On the contrary, emotions require conscious rational thought to be felt; there must be a cognitive process of interpretation for us to feel an emotion like “fear” or “guilt” (Kagan 2007: 23–4). So, in concert with affects, we must have situational awareness: a rational understanding of our context, built with knowledge, customs, and memory. It is here, that social constructivism must play a role: because an essential aspect of feeling an emotion is a cognitive understanding of the situation we are in, and because human contexts differ throughout history and across space, the emotions we feel likewise adapt to our changing environments.

In fact, the language we use to describe emotions—not only does it signify different emotions—causes us to feel different things.<sup>14</sup> In other words, naming emotions, what is called “labeling” them, changes our experience of them, just as explaining them changes how they feel.

So, if shown an image of a spider, first our amygdala is pricked, which then triggers hormonal and adrenal reflexes, which in turn cause feelings (e.g. goosebumps) and, if we believe


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<sup>13</sup> Nussbaum (2001) is the seminal deconstruction of the dichotomy between the two.

<sup>14</sup> The evidence in support of this hypothesis is as conclusive as it is provocative. See Frevert *et al* (2014); Dixon (2012); Gendron (2012); Colombetti (2009, 2014); Reddy (2001); Kovecses (1999, 2000, 2005).

ourselves to be in danger—if perhaps we have strong memories of spiders or have been socialized to feel antagonism towards them—we might feel and then display the socially constructed emotion “fear” or a type of violent “aggression.” Finally, if we translate this emotion into a word and communicate it to another person, we will likely begin to feel the emotion’s symptoms change—depending on the perceived effect of our communication. In short, biology gives the frame within which culture and circumstance act.

Kagan (2007: 23) sums up emotional responses as a four-step process: 1) a change in brain activity to select incentives;<sup>15</sup> 2) a consciously detected change in feeling with sensory qualities; 3) a cognitive process that interprets and/or labels the feeling with words; and 4) a preparedness for or display of a behavioral response.



To sum up the preceding theory: there seem to be transhistorical, neurobiological *impulses* in the human brain, which trigger contextually-dependent *affects*, which are then conceptualized and *rationalized/labeled* by humans-as-actors into the compound constructs we call *emotions*. To return to the working definition I gave above, an emotion is thus a perceived change in one’s mental state both felt physically and rationalized intellectually, in part dependent on how it is understood and expressed. *Aischunē* is both an emotion and the quality of a person who feels that

<sup>15</sup> Thus far I have called these select incentives “stimuli.” Kagan’s terminology is meant to specify that the brain is not triggered by every sense-based stimulus in its environment, but only certain things.

emotion (like “shame” and “sense of shame” in English), and as such, it should be clear now that it relies on cultural and social understanding to be felt.

## **Modern Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment**

Before proceeding to *aischunē*, it’s necessary to consider what English emotions and words we will use as reference points. Thus I will begin with a discussion of the three emotions mentioned above: shame, guilt, and embarrassment. All three are difficult notions to define accurately, even if a distinction seems intuitive. The categories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they as precisely defined in common usage as academic rigor demands. Even in modern psychological discourse—pursuant with the notion that emotions develop over time and change based on one’s social context—these emotions can only be described in broad strokes. It is useful to image a Venn diagram with a great deal of overlap among the three, but distinguishing them as clearly as possible is still useful.

First, shame: it is a painful, physical reaction, often accompanied by blushing, heated neck temperatures, and a strong desire to close one’s eyes or block the face; shame can make us cry, curl our toes and fingers, and, in extreme cases, especially coupled with present anxiety, cause stomach cramping and vomiting (Keats 2012: 622–4). Shame’s rationalization is still a source of consternation and debate, but it is generally triggered by one’s belief that he or she has visibly done something wrong; traditionally, shame has been associated with loss of respect, honor, or dignity in the eyes of others, figured as an externally facing emotion.<sup>16</sup> It is at the same time an intimately personal emotion and a powerful social pressure.

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<sup>16</sup> I will identify the shortcomings of this definition below, after guilt is introduced. My definition most closely follows Keats (2012), and Deonna and Teroni (2008, 2012); this is not much different from the definitions of Gilbert (1998) and Taylor (1987), though updated and nuanced. Where Deonna and Teroni stand apart from other emotional scholars is in arguing for the utility of shame as a basic emotion. They claim earlier scholars, e.g. Wollheim (1999), have argued that shame is a negative force in a community that impedes one’s emotional growth. Their critique is well-founded, even if it attacks an over-simplification of Wollheim’s view.

For example, if one were to be told by a mentor that one's work does not meet expectations, he or she would likely feel shame on account of that failure and the consequent loss of reputation in the eyes of the mentor.

But shame is more complex than this. Again, because the words we use color the way we feel emotions, we need to analyze linguistic choices thoroughly. Aside from an emotional expression, there is also a dispositional statement in our notion of shame: a "sense of shame." To have a sense of shame is to feel appropriate levels of shame when one should, where "appropriate" is defined by one's community or one's expectations of that community. Although "shameful" no longer means "one who feels shame appropriately" in common usage, we have retained "shameless" as a disparagement towards those who do not feel shame when we deem it appropriate to do so. One is shameless if he or she acts in a way that societally should cause them to feel shame, but does not respond thus to his or her own actions or identity.

Moreover, in modern usage, "to shame" is a transitive verb with two rather distinct, polarized senses: to shame someone could mean to bring shame/disgrace/dishonor onto another for one's own actions, e.g. "I shamed my family through my misbehavior," or to cause someone to feel ashamed of his or her own actions, e.g. "His mother shamed him for leaving a mess." The latter permutation is often employed in an attempt to inspire future action, e.g. "His mother shamed him *into* doing the dishes."

Thus in the first sense, a writer could shame his or her publisher by plagiarizing, bringing the publisher shame via the writer's misbehavior; or, in the second, a publisher could attempt to shame a writer into completing a draft, trying to make the writer feel bad for missing a deadline or falling below expectations, thus compelling future action.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> For less common permutations of "shame" as a verb, see the OED.

The latter type of shaming can also be more extreme, i.e. as a form of verbal abuse that harnesses societal pressure in order to hurt another person. The nature of this shaming as an activity lies in its attempt to impose a moral, ethical, or social standard on another person which can affect the victim, even if the victim does not believe in the standards invoked. Often, some criterion is appended to the verb to make explicit what the actor wants the object to feel shame for. Thus “body-shaming” is to cause someone to feel shame based on their appearance, just as “slut-shaming” is an attempt to make women (the notion is gendered) feel shame on account of their sexual activity (Sweeny 2017: 1579–80). Again, the object of such shaming does not need to believe that their actions are morally or ethically reprehensible to feel the painful, physical effects of shaming. For shame to be experienced, it is sufficient that others call the action into question.

Both fat- and slut-shaming are attacks on character or disposition rather than attacks on specific transgressions. While weight and sexual activity involve a series of choices, no individual action is being criticized so much as an individual’s proclivity towards certain actions, his or her disposition. The object of such derision might not believe themselves to be at fault, but the effects of shaming persist. Here the water starts to muddy: in modern American usage, one often names the negative physical reaction to being shamed “guilt.” Thus “shaming” as an active verb has significant overlap with “guilt-tripping,” i.e. attempting to make someone feel guilty. I will discuss this further after distinguishing guilt from shame.

Much ink has been spilled in the past half century trying to distinguish shame from guilt. The question is vital because anthropological distinctions between so-called shame- and guilt-cultures (more below) remain as influential as they are problematic.

To begin with guilt's physical symptoms: like shame, guilt is a painful, physical reaction, but it is as likely to raise body temperature and redden someone as it is to drain the color from their face; often guilt causes one to tense their shoulders and feel intense pain in the abdomen, and, like shame in extreme cases, can cause a person to weep, or cramp and vomit.

Traditionally—since the advent of psychoanalytical theory—guilt has been considered distinct from shame in that it is an internal feeling, arising from self-reflection after one has committed some transgression.<sup>18</sup> Thus whereas shame is thought to be external—feeling bad because of how one imagines that he or she is perceived by others—guilt comes from within: one feels bad in front of the self, having not lived up to one's personal moral standard. Guilt relies on *internal sanctions*, an individual's conscience, whereas shame is caused by *the fear of external sanctions*. In other words, guilt needs no audience but the self, whereas shame looks outward. So, one might feel guilt for telling a lie, even if the listener does not notice it, because the liar knows they have done wrong. Shame, in this figuring, would only be triggered if the liar is caught and comprehends some loss to their reputation. The dichotomy is popular, but unstable.

Bernard Williams (1993: 219–25) nuances this distinction in describing how guilt can be “bootstrapped” by shame. The root of shame, Williams writes, lies in exposure. One experiences a “loss of power” from being witnessed by others—the traditional view of shame—although, that loss of power can be internalized and expressed without the presence of a watcher. Thus, one can imagine an audience and feel shame in front of that internal, imaginary exposure. So shame in Williams' figuring comes both from without and within. Cairns (1993: 16) likewise sees modern shame as an act of “the self's judging the self in terms of some ideal that is one's own;” in other

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<sup>18</sup> For more in-depth discussion of this distinction, see Gilbert and Andrews (1998). For ongoing debate on the utility of each emotion, see Deonna and Teroni (2012), responding primarily to Wollheim (1999). Keats (2012) provides encyclopedic entries on both as facets of trauma. Cairns (1993) is an invaluable source as well for tracing the distinction in classics.



words, imagining an idealized audience provides an internal standard against which an individual judges him- or herself.

To return to the example of a liar: Williams and Cairns would argue a liar could imagine being caught and feel the same shame as a liar actually caught. The fear of future loss of reputation in another's eyes thus becomes an internal sanction, becomes shame at having transgressed, and guilt is thus "bootstrapped" by shame.

Williams instead posits that the fundamental difference between guilt and shame is that guilt needs a *victim*. In other words, an actor must realize that his or her action negatively affected someone, and in considering this victim, the actor feels the pain of guilt. While I cannot call this an absolute criterion, it is helpful.

Another common distinction between shame and guilt claims that shame is a feeling concerned with an individual's character as a whole, whereas guilt concerns itself with a specific action or transgression. In this conception, it is shameful *to be a liar*, whereas it causes guilt *to tell a lie*. Thus H.B. Lewis (1971: 27-36) describes shame as a concern with how one should *be* and guilt with what one should *do*. Lewis' figuring helps to explain why we can feel shame on account of our peers or even for the goals and dreams we may privately hold: a social circle is an extension of one's values, just as private dreams are expressions of these values. Further Lewis' distinction helps to explain why feelings of guilt, but not shame, can be assuaged by confessions, apologies, or making amends.<sup>19</sup> Guilt, like remorse, is a negative response to specific deeds and can be purged if the deed is forgiven. Again, it is best not to overstate the difference. A concern with action overlaps with character more often than not, and the moral quandary of what one should be is not wholly distinct from how one should act. This is, fundamentally, only a

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<sup>19</sup> Cairns (1993: 20-6) discusses Lewis' distinction in depth.

difference of emphasis. As Cairns (1993: 25) puts it, shame versus guilt thus figured is the difference between the sentences: “*I should not have done that,*” versus, “*I should not have done that.*”

To return to the final frustrating wrinkle: the word “guilt” is often used to signify the physical cocktail of symptoms which arise as the result of “being shamed” (Grabe 2017: 412–427 ). In other words, one can say that “guilt” is the feeling of the emotion “shame.”<sup>20</sup> In common usage, then, the word guilt is more closely associated with the physical feelings and sensations operating underneath the emotional superstructures of both guilt and shame.<sup>21</sup> Further, and more unexpectedly, because this feeling of guilt comes as a response to the action of shaming, we can see that, just as shame is not only external, guilt is not only internal.

Before discussing embarrassment, let us take a brief detour to consider the pitfalls of over-distinguishing shame and guilt. In the field of Classics, modern scholarship on guilt and shame must respond to E.R. Dodds’ *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951).<sup>22</sup> He imagines Homeric Greece as a shame-society, a communal organization wherein the prevailing ethical systems rely on how others perceive an actor. Morality, in this figuring, is based on appearances and reputation. A shame-society or shame-culture (both terms are used by Dodds and his followers) relies on external sanctions to impose ethical feeling: actors feel shame because of the way that they imagine they look to others in their community.

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<sup>20</sup> For instance, in the sentence: “After the boy fat-shamed me, I felt so guilty about my eating habits that I vomited.” Such usage highlights the idea that “shaming,” as a verb, is meant to attack one’s dispositional state, but the resulting guilt one feels—in this case the physical manifestation of the emotion shame—is triggered both by a disposition and specific actions.

<sup>21</sup> In this thesis, unless I explicitly state otherwise, I use the words “guilt” and “shame” to refer to the emotions I have so far discussed, although in modern English usage, the word “guilt” is flexible enough to signify both an emotion in and of itself and to signify the feelings of the emotion shame.

<sup>22</sup> Dodds’ work is not the first analysis of guilt and shame, but remains one of the most influential and debated.

Dodds' goal is to set up an antithesis between shame- and guilt-cultures. Shame, in this figuring, evolves into guilt as individuals and communities grow and develop conscience. Human-actors, the argument goes, must develop into morally autonomous individuals who have the capacity to feel guilt based on their view of themselves, rather than their appearance to a community. Shame, then, is put forth as an older and baser emotion, subordinate to guilt. Thus Dodds argues that "European Culture" (to use the antiquated terminology) began with a Homeric shame-society and then matured into a guilt-society with fully realized moral consciousness only after the spread of Christianity.

Dodds was bringing to classics a theory popularized a few years before by anthropologist Ruth Benedict in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Benedict's goal was to explain Japanese culture in contrast to American, proclaiming America a guilt-based, mature society against Japan's more "primitive" honor-based figuring. Both Dodds and Benedict sought to define an "Other" in contrast to their own cultures, and both were invested in ascribing more value to what they perceived as their own societal structure than to that other. Again, while still influential, these axiological judgements have been roundly criticized for their basis in orientalism, presentism, and over-simplification (Creighton 1990).<sup>23</sup>

When Dodds looked to antiquity through Benedict's lens, he saw *aidōs* and *aischunē* as mere extensions of a reputation-based, appearance-based shame. He concluded that Greek morality based itself on reputation because of a double misunderstanding: he not only failed to see how shame, the modern emotion, can be motivated internally, but also failed to appreciate how *aidōs* and *aischunē* encompass to significant degrees what we would call today guilt.

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<sup>23</sup> Williams (1993) and Cairns (1993) both provide sustained critiques of the guilt- versus shame-society dichotomy and its misleading effects in classical scholarship.

Finally, it is time to discuss embarrassment, with which we see very similar physical responses to shame: pain, heated face, desire to veil oneself, etc. Guilt may allow for a wider variety of physiological changes (e.g. feeling hot or cold; growing pale or red), but shame and embarrassment seem only to differ in intensity—and even then, the difference is unstable. However, we conceive of embarrassment differently because it arises in markedly different circumstances. One can be embarrassed without thinking he or she has done anything morally wrong. In other words, embarrassment can be triggered by transgressing a *social* norm rather than a *moral* boundary (Cairns 1993: 7). For instance, an adult may be embarrassed to drink warm milk before bed, even though he or she sees no ethical dilemma in heated dairy, because the habit is associated with young children and so unbecoming of an adult.

There is overlap between shame and embarrassment, but rarely between the latter and guilt. Embarrassment is generally triggered by a social transgression, guilt by a moral one, while shame seems to be induced by both. Further, as in the discussion of shame above, embarrassment theoretically requires a viewer, although an imagined viewer can cause embarrassment just as well.

The differences between shame, guilt, and embarrassment are primarily differences in emphasis. All three may show remarkably similar physiological reactions, but in response to different contextual circumstances. Shame is the most all-encompassing of the three, as both a moral and societal apparatus, as both a fear of external sanctions and a self-imposed internal sanction, but is distinct in being most closely concerned with one's character or dispositional state. Guilt is primarily an internal reaction in response to a moral or ethical transgression, but, as a result of "shaming," is also externally derived from criticisms of disposition. Finally,

embarrassment, while not a less intense or serious emotion, is a response to less weighty transgressions, particularly to a social faux pas. *aischunē*, like *aidōs*, can be all three.

### ***aischunē* and *aidōs***

The last piece of groundwork to lay before proceeding to textual analysis of *Samia* and then *Dyskolos* is a discussion of *aischunē* as it relates to *aidōs*. I have thus far referred to them as a unit because they are—like shame, guilt, and embarrassment—intimately connected terms. Differentiating them is difficult, and, for an analysis of Menander, may not be necessary. While earlier authors use both terms,<sup>24</sup> Menander only uses forms of *aischunē*. *aidōs* was the more archaic and formal term, more appropriate in tragedy and epic than comedy.<sup>25</sup>

Aristotle distinguishes between the two terms in the *Rhetoric* and *Nichomachean Ethics*, as Fussi (2015: 114) summarizes: “while *aidōs* roughly corresponds to a prospective and inhibitory sense of shame for future actions, *aischyunē* [sic] corresponds to the shame one feels for past actions.” In other words, *aidōs* inhibits while *aischunē* reflects. Fussi’s discussion is an illuminating reading of Aristotle, but I hesitate to ascribe too much importance to Aristotle’s distinctions as indications of common Greek usage or understanding. Further, the verbal form *aischunomai*, as Konstan has argued (2006: 93-6) and as Menander’s examples will make plain, can both inhibit (or encourage) future action and reflect upon deeds in the past. Cairns (1993: 415) suggests that “in ordinary Greek *aidōs* and *aischunē* are synonyms ... but *aidōs* is the older and more poetic term.” Menander’s usage certainly seems to match Cairns’ idea, as Menander only uses *aischunē* and is flexible with the term.

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<sup>24</sup> See Cairns (1993: 138-9) for a discussion of *aidōs* and *aischunē* in Homer. In most cases, Cairns writes, “there can be no question but that the words are synonymous.”

<sup>25</sup> Aristophanes uses both terms, but shows a marked preference for *aischunē*. According to the *TLG*, *aidōs* appears only twice in the Aristophanic corpus, whereas *aischunē* occurs twenty times.

*aischunē* is directly related to *aischros* and at its most literal means “disfigured” or “uglyed.”<sup>26</sup> As we will see, the notion of *aischunē* is intimately connected to appearance and reputation, but also is an expression of personal morality. Characters feel *aischunē* as they struggle to act according to their ideals and beliefs, and studying the emotion reveals its multivalence and many encompassed feelings. The most obvious tension of Menander’s *Samia* is between erotic desire and propriety, sexual impulse and decorum; *aischunē* likewise arises as a manifestation of that tension. We can also see how characters express *aischunē* when their masculinity or manhood feels challenged, as well as their status as familial patriarchs. *Dyskolos* is unique in expressing a woman’s *aischunē*—both as an emotion and a disposition.

Studying drama is, of course, not studying emotion directly, but can still give us insight into what spectators believe causes emotion and how an emotion might manifest itself. Menandrian “realism” and psychological plausibility have always been two of his comedy’s primary draws. Aristophanes of Byzantium famously asked “Menander and life! Which of you imitate which?”<sup>27</sup> and while the bounds of Menander’s realism are widely debated,<sup>28</sup> it is generally accepted that, as Balme and Brown (2001: xxvii) write, Menander’s plays “are rooted in the realities of everyday life, and they provide invaluable evidence for social, legal, and religious practices and attitudes, and even for everyday patterns of speech.” I would add to their account of Menander’s evidentiary value the playwright’s capacity to show us how the ancient world felt and experienced emotions.

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<sup>26</sup> Adkins (1960: 30) writes that, in Homer, *aischros* “is the most powerful word used to denigrate a man’s actions.” We must imagine one’s reputation as a quasi-physical entity that can be disfigured or made ugly; thus *aischunē* exists both metaphorically and physically.

<sup>27</sup> Goldberg’s (2007) translation.

<sup>28</sup> Petrides (2014: 11-16) gives a short overview of recent arguments for and against Menandrian “realism” or “naturalism,” concluding that Menander is most realistic in creating and developing character’s psyche and worlds with recognizable moral rules and values. Walton and Arnott (1996: 98-117) share this view. For an in-depth discussion, see Zagagi (1994: 94-141).

## CHAPTER 2: *aischunē* in *Samia*

Menander's *Samia*, like so many other specimens of New Comedy, moves through a number of misunderstandings and miscommunications towards a happy marriage. Before focusing on any one scene, it is useful to get a sense of the play's plot.

The young husband-to-be, Moschion, opens the play with a monologue: Moschion is an Athenian citizen who had been adopted by the wealthy Demeas. They live together with Demeas' foreign girlfriend/mistress Chrysis, a *hetaira* from Samos<sup>29</sup>—whence the title *Samia*. While Demeas and his poorer neighbor Nikeratos had been abroad on business, Moschion impregnated Nikeratos' daughter Plangon, but has promised Plangon and her mother that he will marry the girl as soon as their fathers return. In the meantime, both Plangon and Chrysis have borne children, to Moschion and Demeas, respectively. Plangon and Moschion must hide their child until the wedding, and because Chrysis' child with Demeas died in childbirth, Moschion can take his and Plangon's baby into his home to be fed and cared for by Chrysis.

As the play begins, Moschion is anxious about telling his adopted father what he has done, while, unbeknownst to him, Demeas and Nikeratos return and discuss how they have already made a plan to have Moschion and Plangon wed. The play's conflict seems likely to end just as the play begins, but then Demeas finds Plangon's baby in his house and believes it to be his own with Chrysis. The idea of raising an illegitimate child, a *nothos*, angers Demeas so thoroughly he wants to throw Chrysis out of his house until Moschion talks him out of it. After a lacuna in our manuscript, Demeas' anger has been assuaged and Moschion excitedly agrees to be married to Plangon.

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<sup>29</sup> Demeas has no legal wife in the play, and his love for a *hetaira* (a prostitute or concubine) is one of the play's central sources of stress. In fact, Moschion tells the audience that he believes Demeas refuses to marry Chrysis because Demeas feels *aischunē* on Moschion's account, as discussed below.

Again the plot seems to have resolved and marriage looms, but then Demeas, during the wedding's preparations, overhears a nurse say that the baby is Moschion's and then sees Chrysis breastfeeding the child. Believing now that Chrysis had seduced Moschion—he refuses to entertain the possibility that Moschion would willfully sleep with Chrysis, and has no idea that Moschion was already involved with Plangon—Demeas is overcome once again by anger but this time cannot be soothed. He expels Chrysis from his household and she runs crying to Nikeratos' home.

As the play continues, each character grasps only half-truths as anger and *aischunē* breed more misunderstandings and miscommunications. Moschion confirms to his adopted father that the baby is his, but does not mention Plangon. At first, Moschion is anxious to admit the truth, and then, as the conversation proceeds, he mistakenly believes that his father already knows it. Demeas, who believes his son has just admitted to impregnating his own mistress, is livid at Moschion's apparently shameless behavior and verbally explodes. So too does Nikeratos when he, like Demeas, mistakenly “learns” that Moschion has slept with Chrysis. Nikeratos proclaims that if he had a son who committed such *aischunē* to his bed, he would sell the son and mistress into slavery immediately.

Finally, after Nikeratos storms offstage, Moschion gleans what has happened and explains to his father that the baby is his and Plangon's, not his and Chrysis'. Thus Moschion's and Demeas' conflict comes to an end, but now Nikeratos sees his daughter Plangon nursing the baby and runs onstage fuming at his daughter's infidelity and his wife's apparent lies and conspiracy. Nikeratos now vows to kill Chrysis for so destabilizing his house, and Demeas escorts Chrysis quickly back to his house to protect her. Demeas then soothes Nikeratos' anger,



implying that perhaps Zeus himself impregnated Plangon, and the fathers agree to have their children married.

Thus the conflict is resolved and the play can conclude—but another twist! Moschion, now insulted that Demeas thought that Moschion would have slept with Chrysis, decides to play a trick on his father. He pretends to be going abroad as a mercenary so that his father might beg him to stay. Demeas apologizes and implores Moschion to think about how his actions make them both look, and Moschion finally “gives in” (as he had planned to all along). The play ends with the happy marriage of Moschion and Plangon.

The first expression of *aischunē* in *Samia* is also one of the richest. In Moschion’s opening monologue, he informs spectators of his father’s affair thus:

Σαμίας ἐταίρας εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ  
ἐλθεῖν ἐκεῖνον, πρᾶγμ’ ἴσως ἀνθρώπινον.  
ἔκρυπτε τοῦτ’, ἡσχύνετ’ ἡσθόμην ἐγὼ  
ἄκοντος αὐτοῦ, διελογιζόμην θ’ ὅτι,  
ἂν μὴ γένηται τῆς ἐταίρας ἐγκρατῆς,  
ὕ[π’] ἀντεραστῶν μεираκίων ἐνοχλήσεται  
τοῦτο <δὲ> ποῆσαι δι’ ἔμ’ ἴσως **αἰσχύνεται**· (21–7)<sup>30</sup>

[Demeas] fell in love with a Samian courtesan, possibly a normal thing for a human.<sup>31</sup> He hid this [because] he **felt *aischunē***. I found out, although he did not want [me to], and I reckoned that, unless he took her under his protection,<sup>32</sup> he would be vexed by competing young lovers, but perhaps he **feels *aischunē*** to do this on my account.

While the emotions here are only hypothetical—i.e. Moschion’s idea of what his adopted father might feel—unpacking this short speech reveals a great deal about Moschion’s expectations of masculine behavior, familial norms, and propriety, and how *aischunē* acts across all these

<sup>30</sup> Greek text of Sandbach (1990). All translations are my own.

<sup>31</sup> Rendering ἀνθρώπινον in English is difficult, thus I gloss “normal for a human.” Compare Traill (2008: 156): “It was only human.”

<sup>32</sup> Literally, “became the master of the *hetaira*,” Moschion here suggests that Demeas should control access to Chrysis by bringing her into their home, not by marrying her and becoming her legal “master.”

categories as a prohibitory force and social pressure. In Moschion's figuring, *aischunē* inhibited Demeas from two things: first, he did not want to tell his son about his foreign escort-girlfriend, and second, he was reluctant to take her into his home under his protection, on Moschion's account.

To begin with grammatical certainties: both instances of *aischunē* here involve middle-passive forms of *aischunō*. In the first case ("he hid this [because] he felt *aischunē*"), Demeas most logically is the subject of both clauses: thus the verbal voice denotes that Demeas feels *aischunē* and explains the cause of the first.<sup>33</sup> Moschion is glossing why his father might have hid the existence of his new Samian girlfriend: Demeas felt *aischunē* at having fallen in love with a young, Samian *hetaira* and does not want to tell others about his behavior. *aischunē*, in Moschion's telling, thus prevents Demeas from openly speaking of his love: it acts as a prohibitory or inhibitory emotion to check Demeas' potential social transgression.

The actual transgression, however, Moschion minimizes. In Moschion's telling, Demeas' love is "normal for a human, I guess" (22 ἵσως ἀνθρώπινον)—certainly not a crime and hardly presented as a transgression. Moschion does not explicitly disapprove of Demeas' actions, nor does he make it sound like Demeas disapproves. There is no understood victim. If Demeas has misbehaved, Moschion represents his misconduct as imminently forgivable. In other words, there is no moral judgement against Demeas in these lines, but a recognition that social mores have been crossed: Demeas has acted outside the bounds of propriety. This *aischunē* is thus defined primarily by how Demeas' action may be perceived by others, not by any internal moral concern

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<sup>33</sup> An alternative reading that slightly changes the shade of the line: ἡσχύνει' could be impersonal and 23 thus rendered "he hid this; it was *aischunē*-causing [for him]." The change in emphasis here would focus on the action itself as misbehavior rather than Demeas as the one misbehaving.

over the ethics of his love. That is to say, Demeas perceives no victim of his love; his *aischunē* pushes him to hide his actions from all possible witnesses, including his son.

This first expression seems most closely to map onto “embarrassment:” anxiety or pain over the recognition of a transgression of communal customs (but not necessarily ethical or moral concerns) which causes one to want to hide their action from view to protect their social standing. I would thus render the first half of line 23: “he hid this from me because he was embarrassed.” Bringing Chrysis into the home, though, brings on a host of new circumstances and will force us to translate the second instance of *aischunē* differently.

After Moschion realizes his father’s secret love and confronts him about it, Demeas still refuses to bring Chrysis under his protection. Moschion must convince Demeas to do so, although that final part of his monologue has been lost. Grammatically, this instance of the verb *aischunō* takes an infinitive of an action that causes the actor to feel *aischunē*: “perhaps he feels *aischunē* to do this,” (27 τοῦτο <δὲ> ποιῆσαι) that is, to bring Chrysis into his home, under his protection. Moschion further posits that Demeas feels *aischunē* on his account (“because of me,” 27 δι’ ἑμ).

One must consider the nature of Demeas’ misbehavior in protecting Chrysis in his home: Traill notes that an Athenian citizen faced serious judgement for bringing a *hetaira* into his household.<sup>34</sup> Sommerstein (2013: 108) additionally remarks that, because Demeas is much older than Chrysis, Demeas would be susceptible to even more serious derision from his peers on account of the age difference. Lape (2004: 139) notes that, while relations with *hetairai* were

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<sup>34</sup> (2008: 156): “The standard to which Athenians held women like Chrysis was low and a citizen who brought a hetaira into his household could not expect much sympathy. It was an intolerable affront to a wife (the act of a ὑβριστής, ‘scoundrel,’ Andoc. 4.14) and a grown son might also object (Hypereides kicked his son out of the house before bringing in a hetaira, Athen. 13.590c). Even the liberal-minded Moschion admits that falling for Chrysis was nothing to be proud of (‘It was only human’).”

“tolerated in comedy and society,” they were “supposed to be the stuff of youth,” and, more importantly, “such affairs could inflame class resentments, as Attic lawsuits suggest.” Further, cohabiting with a *hetaira* would have been considered an elitist, selfish action because “it was an arrangement not available to every citizen,” and “it suggested untoward privileging of personal preference over civic communal norms” (Lape 2004: 140).

Moreover, that Chrysis was Samian comes with a whole host of expectations. Traill (2008: 157) not only remarks on the impropriety of living with an alien, a non-citizen, but also points out that Samian *hetairai* were especially eroticized for their desirability and reputedly loose morals, thus doubling the taboo of living with one long-term. In an apt comparison, Traill (2008: 157) dubs Chrysis “the ‘French maid’ whose presence eroticizes everything.”<sup>35</sup> So first, as above, it is easy to see how Demeas’ action might negatively affect his own image and make him more *aischros* in the view of his community. Thus his *aischunē* would again be a prohibitory emotion at the thought of a future misdeed that could harm Demeas’ image, which one might call “embarrassment” or “shame,” depending on the perceived severity of the transgression.

However, Demeas’ decision to bring Chrysis home would not be a private crime (as his inappropriate love had been) but could harm his household’s reputation as well—and thus lower Moschion’s social standing (Sommerstein 2013: 109). Moschion’s words, “on my account,” are taken to mean “because his action would also harm me.” In other words, feeling *aischunē* here would require Demeas to consider his reputation *vis-à-vis* his son’s; accordingly, both Demeas’ peers and Moschion’s would see the father and son in worse light because of the misdeeds of the father. Demeas’ *aischunē* on Moschion’s account would therefore be an acknowledgment not

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<sup>35</sup> For more on the relations between fathers, sons, and *hetairai* in Menander, see Webster (1974: 25-42).

only that Demeas has disobeyed certain social customs regarding expected marital praxis and social class boundaries in his passion for Chrysis, but also that such a transgression would tangibly weaken his household's reputation and in so doing also harm his son Moschion.

In this reading, with Moschion-as-victim, *aischunē* maps more closely onto guilt, but not precisely. Such a figuring renders *aischunē* again as a sort of anxiety, though here an anticipatory remorse for a potential harm in the future. It is both determined by how Demeas would look to his community and by how his actions would affect Moschion, and so a kind of inhibitory, proleptic guilt.

There is, however, another possible reading of “on my account,” (27 δι’ ἑμῶν). Thus far, I have discussed how the line could signify that Demeas feels *aischunē* because his actions would have a victim—Moschion—but one could also read δι’ ἑμῶν to refer to a viewer rather than victim. In other words, Moschion could be saying that Demeas feels *aischunē* in protecting Chrysis *in front of Moschion*, i.e. with his son as a spectator. The emphasis changes: rather than “he would hurt to do that because it would hurt me,” one could read “he would hurt to do that because I am watching [and he knows I would disapprove].” This alternative returns us to a more explicitly reputation-focused reading of *aischunē*, closer to traditional shame, but this time emphasizing not what is socially correct for Demeas as a male Athenian citizen, but what is familially correct for Demeas as Moschion's father.

The *aischunē* that Moschion reports (27) is therefore at least triply determined: Demeas feels *aischunē* because 1) his reputation in front of his peers will be diminished by breaking Athenian conventions and taking a *hetaira* into his home; 2) his actions will harm his son; and 3) his son will likewise disapprove of such misbehavior. Consequently, Moschion is a witness and a victim; Demeas both loses face and harms another.

Such a feeling might be encompassed in the modern notion of “shame;” the *LSJ* (B.II.2.c) suggests translating “he is ashamed to do this, perhaps because of me.” But the emotional complexity at play in this line is best conveyed without any specific Anglo-emotion word, especially considering a translation of a play can fill in context and allow actors (or imagined actors) to fill in meaning. I offer instead, “maybe my father wouldn’t do this because of me.” In both cases, *aischunē* is an inhibitory emotion, a pain that Moschion reads into his father’s disinclination first to speak openly about Chrysis and then to bring her into their home.

One final consideration: paradoxically, *aischunē*, the inhibitory emotion, is also what ultimately *permits* Demeas to transgress customary sexual praxis without negatively affecting his reputation in the eyes of spectators. Because he feels *aischunē* about his action—because, we might say, he has a “sense of shame”—his feelings and moral standards (again, at least according to Moschion’s telling) uphold customary Athenian sexual practices. As Lape (2004: 139–40) remarks, it is precisely Demeas’ *aischunē* that “allows him to have it both ways ... [to] violate normative sociosexual practices while simultaneously reinforcing the very value system their passions have breached.”<sup>36</sup> Moschion suggests that Demeas give in to his amatory desires in spite of Athenian custom, and because Demeas properly feels *aischunē* to do this—because he has a “sense of *aischunē*”—we read him as a morally upstanding character. In other words, communal and sexual norms are so ingrained in Demeas that he feels psychic and somatic pain at the thought breaking them; his pain and reluctance at breaking them supports the validity of accepted orthodoxies; therefore, his *aischunē* allows him to simultaneously transgress and uphold Athenian sexual and domestic customs.

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<sup>36</sup> Lape (2004: 141) here extrapolates that the play’s monologue-heavy form mirrors an Athenian law-court, with spectators as a stand-in jury, in order to argue that *Samia* is a profoundly political and subversive play.

That Moschion narrates his father's *aischunē* anticipates his own troubles. A little later in Moschion's opening monologue, after a lacuna, he lays out the central conflict driving the drama: his own erotic desires led him to break the law and father a child out of wedlock. The crux of the plot relies on his baby. But Moschion never quite admits his action, not even to spectators:

ἐπὶ τὸ τέγος κήπους γὰρ ἀνέφερόν τινας,  
 ὥρχοι[ν]τ', ἐπαννύχιζον ἐσκεδασμέναι.  
 ὁκνῶ λέγειν τὰ λοιπ', ἴσως δ' **αἰσχύνομαι**  
 ὅτ']<sup>37</sup> οὐδὲν ὄφελός ἐσθ'· ὅμως **αἰσχύνομαι**.  
 ἐκύησεν ἡ παῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ φράσας λέγω  
 καὶ τὴν πρὸ τούτου πράξιν. οὐκ ἡρνησάμην  
 τὴν αἰτίαν σχών, ἀλλὰ πρότερος ἐνέτυχον  
 τῇ μητρὶ τῆς κόρης, ὑπεσχόμην γαμεῖν  
 [...]<sup>38</sup> ἐπὶ ἐλθὲ ποθ' ὁ πατήρ, <ἐπ>ώμοσα. (45–53)

They<sup>38</sup> were carrying some plants<sup>39</sup> up to the roof and [dancing], and they celebrated all night long. I am afraid to say the rest, and **I feel *aischunē***, perhaps [when] there is no benefit, but nevertheless **I feel *aischunē***. The girl got pregnant. By saying this, I'm also telling [you] what happened before. I did not deny the fault was mine, but before being accused, I went to the girl's mother quickly,<sup>40</sup> I promised to marry [her] when [her] father<sup>41</sup> returned. I swore.

Like so many New Comedy plots, *Samia*'s begins with sexual misbehavior. Moschion admits to impregnating his neighbor, but refuses to name his transgression explicitly because of his *aischunē*. Again, *aischunē* is expressed in the middle-passive voice, indicating that Moschion

<sup>37</sup> I follow Arnott (2000) in reading “ὅτ’” here, where Sandbach (1990) has “οἷς.” The difference is the bracketed “when” above versus a dative explaining what Moschion feels ashamed of, i.e. “these things.”

<sup>38</sup> Plangon, her mother, Chrysis, and other women, celebrating the rites of Adonis.

<sup>39</sup> Apparently as part of the celebration of Adonis. Arnott (2000: 21) explains: “For the festival women sowed seeds which quickly germinated and as quickly withered in their pots, which they carried up onto the rooftops. This early growth and early decay seemed to symbolize the life of Adonis.” The *LSJ* entry for κῆπος notes that the word is also slang for a woman's genitalia, so there may be a pun.

<sup>40</sup> Sommerstein (2013: 115) suggests translating πρότερος: “I took the initiative and ...”

<sup>41</sup> Both Demeas and Nikeratos, Plangon's father, are abroad, and both will return together. However, this line must refer to Nikeratos because, as Sommerstein (2013: 116) notes, only Nikeratos has the legal right to give away his daughter in marriage, and in fact, Moschion's adoptive father will not be a party to the marriage contract at all.

himself feels the emotion. It is left unclear whether Moschion seduced Plangon or raped her, but Lape (2004: 143–5) makes a convincing argument for the former. Regardless, under Athenian law, seduction was tantamount to rape. While today we characterize the morality of a sexual act by the consent of the two partners, in Athenian law a woman’s father (or protector) controlled access to her, and it was *his* consent that was necessary for licit sexual relations.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, what we call “seduction” was in Athens a crime and offense against the male responsible for the female, and (paradoxically to modern readers) was likely considered even more grievous.<sup>43</sup> Lape (2008: 144) explains that seduction, as opposed to rape, was the “paradigmatic sexual offense,” a “quintessentially antidemocratic crime ... characteristic of the newly rich and hubris-prone aristocrats.”

Comic protagonists generally do not seduce virgins, but Lape (2008: 143–7) argues that Moschion is an exception. Rape, rather than seduction, allows for a non-complicated resolution of plot because the woman involved was not morally compromised. In a comic rape plot, the woman has done no wrong, whereas a woman seduced has also transgressed. Lape argues that all the play’s evidence points to seduction rather than rape, given the assumptions of other characters, context of the act (fertility festival of Adonis), non-inebriation, and even Moschion’s name, which is generally the name of a comedy’s “rival and would-be-seducer” rather than “romantic protagonist-rapist.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Pierce (1997: 166) explains: “For the purposes of New Comedy it is apparently preferable that a ‘respectable’ woman should be raped rather than seduced. Physically her honour may have been defiled but mentally she remained pure. To portray an Athenian girl being seduced would perhaps have reduced her respectability in the eyes of the audience. Paradoxically we find that the force of rape, as is so often illustrated by the torn clothing of the victim, emphasizes the respectability of the woman raped.”

<sup>43</sup> Omitowoju (2002: 197–203 ) discusses the political implications of rape in ancient Athens in an analysis of forensics and Menander’s comedy, and *Samia* specifically pp. 197–203.

<sup>44</sup> See further Lape (2008: 143-5).



Moschion's singularity of action then would align with another peculiarity of his character: he is the only surviving Menandrian protagonist who explicitly expresses that he regrets his sexual misconduct, in this case confessing his *aischunē*.<sup>45</sup> Nonetheless, Moschion has already taken action to alleviate his *aischunē*. By promising to marry Plangon, he has made amends with her family and could assume that his action would be forgiven and the marriage accepted, especially given his and Demeas' higher socio-economic status.<sup>46</sup> Thus his conscience should be clear, but still, "perhaps to no benefit," he feels *aischunē* (47-8 ἴσως δ' αἰσχύνομαι / ὅτ' οὐδὲν ὄφελός ἐσθ' ὅμως αἰσχύνομαι). Moschion implies that he feels *aischunē* inappropriately: he has already made amends with Plangon's family, but still feels distressed. The "benefit" of *aischunē*, in Moschion's telling, is that it led him to rectify his behavior and face Plangon's mother; now he is saying that his *aischunē* has not been assuaged.<sup>47</sup>

Moschion cannot straightforwardly admit, even to spectators outside the world of the play, that his desire overcame his decency. His *aischunē* here is both remorse for a specific transgression, closer to our "guilt," and anxiety over admitting his error in front of an audience, like our "shame." Further, his *aischunē*, as a complex of both emotions, is stronger than Athenian law: even after having made amends and promising to marry Plangon, Moschion's *aischunē* lingers. By marrying Plangon he would be cleared of societally-enforced *aischunē* before the law and free himself as well from having shamed Plangon's father Nikeratos; still, he acted in a way discordant with his view of himself. He disproves of his own actions—perhaps

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<sup>45</sup> See Lape (2004: 142), who points out that Charisios in *Epitrepontes* (644-6) might also express remorse at having raped Pamphile, though he doesn't in the text we have. Charisios expresses explicit remorse for fathering a bastard, but not for seducing/raping Pamphile.

<sup>46</sup> Omitowaju (2002: 184) and Sommerstein (2013: 30-6) discuss how charges of rape can be atoned for with a promise of marriage in New Comedy and Athenian law more broadly.

<sup>47</sup> Perhaps Menander here is making a subtle critique of Athenian customs: if Moschion's *aischunē* is still justified, even after he has agreed to marry Plangon and has been legally exonerated, then perhaps his transgression was more severe than the law treats it. Thus Moschion feels as if his marriage-promise is not sufficient to absolve his *aischunē*.

because he sees Plangon or Nikeratos as his victim or perhaps he sees how his actions would hurt his father—and thus cannot bear the shame of an audience judging him. In this case, *aischunē* encompasses a legal-external shame/guilt, already overcome, as well as the insurmountable internal shame/guilt of having wronged Plangon or Nikeratos (victims), as seen by the audience (the literal and figurative observer).

Finally, that he now feels *aischunē* over his action, that he has a sense of shame and disapproves of his own action, shows that such misbehavior is not because of some ingrained character trait. It was, as Kiritsi (2013: 94) notes, “a momentary lapse, pardonable in part because of his youth and the influence of passion.”

Moschion’s *aischunē* is therefore an inhibitory force, preventing his confessions, and a retrospective, moral concern at having done harm. I thus translate *aischunē* “shame” or “ashamed,” given the flexibility of the English concept to cover so many facets of emotion, and the nature of dramatic monologue. I render lines 47–8: “I hesitate to say what happened next. Maybe I’m ashamed, even though there’s no need to be, but still, I am ashamed.”<sup>48</sup>

Moschion expresses a similar feeling later to his slave and confidant Parmenon, but this time a conflict of masculinity is central, and the notion of *aischunē* is explicitly colored with the feeling of fear:

- (Πα) ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἔσει  
ἀνδρεῖος εὐθύς τ’ ἐμβαλεῖς περὶ τοῦ γάμου  
λόγον.  
(Μο) τίνα τρόπον; δειλὸς ἤδη γίνομαι  
ὥς πλησίον τὸ πρᾶγμα γέγονε.  
(Πα) πῶς λέγεις;  
(Μο) **αἰσχύνομαι** τὸν πατέρα.  
(Πα) τὴν δὲ παρθένον  
ἦν ἠδίκηκας τὴν τε ταύτης μητέρα  
ὅπως—τρέμεις, ἀνδρόγυνε; (63–9)

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Christenson (2015: 128): “Perhaps I’m ashamed / When there’s no point in being so—but I’m still ashamed.”

P: Well now, be a man and tell [your father] about your marriage straightaway.  
 M: How? I have become a coward, now that the time is at hand.  
 P: What are you saying?  
 M: **I feel *aischunē*** in front of my father.  
 P: But [do you feel *aischunē* in front of]<sup>49</sup> the girl whom you've wronged and her mother, since—are you trembling, you sissy?

Parmenon reprimands his young master for delaying to tell Demeas that he has fathered a child.

Although Moschion has already made preparations for his wedding, he cannot bring himself to name his crime to his own father. He has no reason to fear physical punishment, yet he tells

Parmenon: 67 αἰσχύνομαι τὸν πατέρα. Translating αἰσχύνομαι, again middle-passive, to mean “I feel *aischunē*,” we can take the accusative τὸν πατέρα as the person before whom Moschion feels *aischunē* as *LSJ* B.II.3 suggest.

Calling himself a coward (65 δειλός) contextualizes his emotion as a kind of fear, although nothing in the play suggests that Moschion should fear severe castigation from his father. Moschion is likely ashamed to admit any wrongdoing to Demeas, who treated him so well, not for fear of punishment, but rather because he knows he has not upheld familial standards. While his adopted father provided for him in abundance, his actions do not befit a good son. He wants to hide his transgression from his father so as not to tarnish his reputation in Demeas' eyes, and feels the anticipatory pain of *aischunē* when he thinks about confessing.

Parmenon's response recontextualizes the emotion. He incredulously reprimands his young master by directly continuing Moschion's thought and adding two more accusatives to his syntax: the girl and her mother (67-8 τὴν δὲ παρθένον ... τὴν τε ταύτης μητέρα) must also be understood as objects of αἰσχύνομαι, and Parmenon thus changes the verb's resonance. Whereas Moschion's *aischunē* here is based on how his father might perceive him in the future, Parmenon forces him to think more broadly and consider not only himself in the future, but also those

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<sup>49</sup> Alternate translations of this line follow in the discussion below.

whom he wronged in the past. Parmenon's appeal is towards an internal *aischunē*, focused on the victims of Moschion's inaction.

Parmenon begins with an injunction that Moschion be "manly" (64 ἀνδρεῖος) and, after hearing Moschion's reluctance, closes by insulting and questioning his masculinity with ἀνδρόγυνος, rendered as "sissy," or even more rudely (cf. *LSJ* A.I.3 s.v.), "pussy."<sup>50</sup> Parmenon's insults construe Moschion's inaction as a transgression of proper masculine action. He is in effect "shaming" his young master in an attempt to spur on action.

It is one of the many paradoxes of emotion that the same *aischunē* which *prevents* Moschion from speaking to his father openly, when recontextualized, simultaneously *motivates* Moschion to speak to his father openly. Parmenon puts Moschion into something of a double-bind: Moschion feels *aischunē* to speak to his father because his actions do not align with his ideal self, but he should also feel *aischunē* not to speak to his father because he has harmed Plangon and acts like a coward in hiding this fact. By not feeling the latter *aischunē*, Parmenon alleges that Moschion is failing in his duties as a man. We might say that in his shame, he is acting shamelessly. Here we could reconstruct Parmenon's incomplete question: "but don't you feel guilty because of what you did to the girl whom you wronged and her mother?"

Parmenon's rebuttal is also unique in that it implies Moschion perhaps should feel *aischunē* in front of women. It is a generic convention that women do not have the freedom to express as many emotions as men,<sup>51</sup> but what makes Parmenon's outburst so striking is that it could make Plangon and her mother the *viewers* of Moschion's crimes, rather than just the

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<sup>50</sup> The repertoire of English language insults meant to call masculinity in question is vast. Cf. Christenson (2015: 129), "you pantywaist!"

<sup>51</sup> See Dutsch and Konstan (2011) for a discussion specifically of women's anger in New Comedy. They conclude (60–3) that, in *Samia*, anger is "the prerogative of free adult males." Campeggiani (2013) discusses how expressions of anger (*orgē*) in Greek literature more broadly establish the social identity of male characters.

victims—as I translated above, “*aischunē* in front of ...” Parmenon’s would thus be more insulting. Moschion’s honor or reputation as an Athenian citizen should be based on how he is perceived by his peers and superiors, and in Athenian logic that would not include women; however, Parmenon suggests that Moschion should feel *aischunē* in front of women—that perhaps he would be motivated to act correctly if he felt *aischunē* in front of women.

To translate this conversation, I would expand Parmenon’s line to make explicit how he wants to recontextualize Moschion’s emotion:

M: I’m ashamed to face my father.

P: You should be ashamed *not* to, because of the girl you’ve injured and her mother! Are you just scared, sissy? (67-9)

An alternative reading and punctuation of the line slightly changes its meaning. Arnott (2000: 26–7) reads 69 **πῶς οὐ** τρέμεις, ἀνδρόγυνε; rather than **ὅπως**—τρέμεις, ἀνδρόγυνε. Arnott thus takes τρέμεις to govern the earlier accusatives and translates: “How’s it you don’t fear the girl you’ve injured and her mother, you sissy?”<sup>52</sup> While that requires a significant change in English translation, the Greek still offers the ambiguity of the maiden and mother (τὴν δὲ παρθένον ... τὴν τε ταύτης μητέρα) as a newly supplied object of Moschion’s αἰσχύνομαι until the end of the Greek sentence, when the main verb comes. This heightens the gendered insult—Parmenon directly accuses Moschion of being scared of two females—and retains the underlying recontextualization of Moschion’s *aischunē* in the Greek. However, I prefer the aposiopesis initially offered, as it is the only way to make clear in English that Plangon and her mother could be new grammatical objects of Moschion’s verbal expression.

Two scenes remain to be discussed. There are no more explicit instances of *aischunē* in any of its forms in the surviving manuscripts of *Samia*, but in the first case to be discussed, a

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<sup>52</sup> Christenson (2015: 129) likewise translates: “But how’s it happen that you have no fear of the girl / You’ve wronged and her mother?”

scene with lacunae, supplementation has restored two verbal forms of *aischunē*. In the second case, Demeas delivers a monologue which outlines some necessary parameters of a shame/embarrassment emotion, although he does not explicitly use *aischunē*. Even without an explicit mention, both scenes deserve attention.

In the first of these two scenes, the play has progressed significantly, almost to its climax. Moschion thinks his father knows that he got Plangon pregnant; Demeas thinks that Moschion has confessed to getting Chrysis pregnant. Moschion is surprised that his father is so angry, and protests, 485-7 τὸ πρᾶγμα γάρ / ἐστὶν οὐ πάνδεινον, ἀλλὰ μυρίοι δῆπου, πάτερ, / τοῦτο πεποίηκασιν, “the deed was not that bad, and surely tons of people have done it.” Demeas understandably is enraged, and orders Moschion to admit who the mother of his child is 487-8 ἐναντίον / δὴ σ’ ἐρωτῶ τῶν παρόντων, “before the people here,”<sup>53</sup> and, more importantly, to Nikeratos. Moschion is once again afraid to confess the truth when Nikeratos enters. Like Demeas, Nikeratos believes that Moschion has fathered a baby with Chrysis, and he is similarly enraged.

Nikeratos comes onstage yelling. He delivers a highly allusive, paratragic lament on the depths of Moschion’s depravity, which he caps off by saying what he’d do in Demeas’ situation and how he would punish his hypothetical son. With supplementation, he twice mentions *aischunē*, in a way wholly different from the examples given above. Here is the final portion of his speech:

(Nι) τίνος ἀπόσχοι’ ἂν σύ; ποῖον οὐκ ἂν [αἰσχύνουσιν] ἐχ[ος]<sup>54</sup>  
 εἴτ’ ἐγὼ σοι δῶ γυναῖκα τὴν ἐμαυτ[οῦ] θυγατέρα;  
 πρότερον—εἰς κόλπον δέ φασι· τὴν Ἀδ[ράστειαν] σέβω—

<sup>53</sup> Characters in *Samia* often address spectators in monologues, but there are very few appeals—in all of Menander—to the audience during dialogue. Arnott (2000: 123) notes, “it is unusual for a character in Menander to bring the theatre audience into the dramatic action.” But, as Lape (2004: 141) points out, given that *Samia* borrows heavily from courtroom procedure, this gesture does not seem out of place.

<sup>54</sup> With Arnott’s (2000) supplements.

- ἐπὶ Διομνήστῳ γενοίμην νυμφίῳ [  
ὁμολογουμένην ἀτυχίαν.  
(Δη) τα.[  
ἡδικοῦμενος κατεῖχον.  
(Νι) ἀνδράποδ[ον εἶ, Δημέα.  
εἰ γὰρ ἐμὸν **ἦι[σχυνε** λέ]κτρον, οὐκ ἂν εἰς ἄλλον ποτὲ  
ὑβρις· οὐδ' ἢ συγ[κλ]ιθεῖσα· παλλακὴν δ' ἂν αὔριον  
πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἐπώλουν, συναποκηρύττων ἅμα  
ὑόν, ὥστε μηθὲν εἶναι μήτε κουρεῖον κενόν,  
μὴ στοάν, καθημένους δὲ πάντας ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ  
περὶ ἐμοῦ λαλεῖν λέγοντας ὡς ἀνὴρ Νικήρατος  
γέγον' ἐπεξελθὼν δικαίως τῷ φόνῳ. (501–13)

N: Who would you (Moschion) keep yourself from? [To] what [bed] would [you] not [**do aischunē**?] And then, am I to give my [daughter] to you as a wife? I'd sooner—into the lap, (as) they say!<sup>55</sup> I [worship Nemesis]—I would have her marry Diomnestus<sup>56</sup> [(?)] an agreed-upon misfortune!

D: [(?) I, having been wronged, restrained [(?).

N: [Demeas, you're acting] like a slave.<sup>57</sup> If he'd [**done aischunē**] to my bed, he would never have outraged another, nor would his bedmate! I'd have been the first man to sell off his concubine the next day, and I would sell off my son together with her! Then, no barber's shop<sup>58</sup> nor *stoa* would be empty, everyone (would be) sitting from dawn to prattle about me, saying that Nikeratos turned out to be a man, justly carrying out the sentence for murder!

Because of the fragmentary nature of this exchange, we must proceed with caution. 501

αἰσχύνους is a conjecture, and its object λέχος, if correct, is only legible in its middle two letters, —έχ—. The reading of 507 is near certain. Sandbach (1990: 254) prints no alternate readings in 507, and Katsouris (2004: 14) deems ἦι[σχυνε λέ]κτρον a probable reading. The two expressions are essentially identical in meaning.

Since these instances of *aischunē* are active, they have a different sense from the middle-passive usages we have examined thus far. Rather than a character's felt *aischunē*, the emotion,

<sup>55</sup> Nikeratos shortens a Greek proverb, "I spit into my lap," which, like "knocking on wood" today, is meant to avert bad consequences. Worshipping Nemesis worked similarly. See Arnott (2000: 126-7).

<sup>56</sup> The reference is unclear; he is apparently a notorious adulterer.

<sup>57</sup> Christenson (2015: 149) glosses the insult thus: "I.e., a dishonorable coward, as slaves were assumed to be in the ideology of ancient slavery."

<sup>58</sup> The κουρεῖον, like the στοά, was a place where men gathered to talk and spread rumors, cf. *LSJ* s.v.

this instance maps more closely to the transitive English verb “dishonor.” To do the verbal action of *aischunō* to an object is to imbue that object with *aischunē*; it is to diminish the object’s reputation in a way that causes them *aischunē*. Menander elsewhere uses the verb with a person as direct object meaning to directly dishonor someone,<sup>59</sup> but in this passage its object is a bed (λέχος and λέκτρον).<sup>60</sup> In essence, Nikeratos is saying that Moschion has acted with such *hybris* that he has caused his father’s bed to become a source of *aischunē*. An artless translation of 507 εἰ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἦσχυνε λέκτρον ... is useful to illustrate the point: “if he’d treated my marital bed in such a way as to lessen my reputation and thus potentially cause me to feel *aischunē* ...” Again, this is similar to the verb “dishonor,” or “shame” in an active sense.

What is more interesting here than the particulars of verbal *aischunē* is how Nikeratos plans to expiate his *aischunē* and how he connects the emotion to his character as a man and a father. Nikeratos imagines himself shamed, and prescribes an extreme solution as recourse for such shaming. Because Moschion has, in Nikeratos’ opinion, committed a grievous offense against his father and family, the only proper recompense for such action is to expel him from the family.<sup>61</sup> On top of that, Nikeratos says he would expel his own wife (or mistress; he is imprecise as to how his hypothetical household would look) and then sell both of them into slavery. He then explains *why* he would punish them in such a way: it would be the only way to reinforce his status “as a man” (512 ὡς ἀνὴρ) in his community. Reputation, manhood, and

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<sup>59</sup> *Dis Exapaton* 17: ἅπαντας αἰσχύνει γὰρ ἡμᾶς τοῦ[ς] φίλους, “for he dishonors/imbues all our friends with *aischunē*.”

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 944, “ἦσχυνε τὰμὰ λέκτρα.” *lechos* and *lektron* are virtually synonymous, but, as Sommerstein (2013: 259) notes “the word λέκτρον and the omission of the article are features of tragic language; λέκτρον occurs ninety-nine times in the thirty-two extant tragedies, in comedy only here.”

<sup>61</sup> Nikeratos speaks as though Moschion slept with his own mother, rather than his adopted-father’s girlfriend in a comic parody of tragic laments. He calls Moschion’s misdeed the crime of Thyestes, Oedipus, and Tereus (line 496). N.R.E. Fisher (1992: 104-11) further discusses Moschion’s crimes vis-à-vis tragic offenses and acts of *hybris* in Euripides.



*aischunē* are thus inextricably bound in Nikeratos' figuring. An insult to one would be an insult to all three, and to repair one would reaffirm all three.<sup>62</sup>

Finally, Nikeratos stresses the importance of broadcasting his revenge in public. Hofmeister (1997: 295) notes that the *koureion* and *stoa* are notably "low places," pedestrian haunts, further emphasizing the class difference between Nikeratos and Demeas. Nikeratos wants his *kleos* spread throughout the polis; to him, the polis is made up of "low places," where men will gossip about his justified revenge.<sup>63</sup>

In sum, Nikeratos' hypothetical is his attempt to express his proper sense of *aischunē* as propriety and manhood and familial praxis. In his view, Moschion has done something unforgivable, tantamount to murder, in sleeping with his mother (or maternal figure) and disrespecting his father. He has thus brought *aischunē* onto his household, injuring his and his father's reputations, *aischunē* which could only be forgiven if Moschion were publicly expelled from the family. Only then would the patriarch's reputation be repaired within his community. Thus Nikeratos appeals to a reputational *aischunē*, a potential source of, but not itself an example of, the interior emotion.

The final scene to be discussed does not contain explicit mention of *aischunē*, but still illustrates its intricate workings. After all misunderstandings have been cleared up and Moschion's and Plangon's wedding is at hand, Moschion decides to play a trick on his father. He feels insulted that his father could have ever believed he would sleep with Chrysis, and wants to

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<sup>62</sup> See also Dutsch and Konstan's (2011:) discussion of male anger in *Samia*. Nikeratos' uninhibited response to personal slights aligns with his conception of proper performative masculinity. Nikeratos' speech also nicely complements Campeggiani's (2013) work on *orgē* as a source of identity formation for Athenian men.

<sup>63</sup> Hofmeister (1997: 295-6) points out how the social and economic class differences at play in this section turn Nikeratos' hypothetical grandstanding into a critique of Demeas' masculinity: "the 'poor' neighbor also feels a delight in debasing his richer, more successful 'partner' ... Nikeratos imagines himself specifically as acting in a manly way ... and this implies that Demeas is less of a man than he should be, or certainly less of one than his social inferior, Nikeratos. Though he seems to ally with Demeas, at the same time Nikeratos makes this a capital occasion for redressing the imbalance in their relationship, which arises from their differences in status and wealth."

punish Demeas for such an assumption. Moschion pretends to take up arms as a mercenary and go abroad (616–40). His father responds sympathetically—perhaps more so than Moschion deserves—by telling his son that he understands and appreciates Moschion’s anger, and that he takes all the blame for the day’s misdeeds (695–702). He then tells Moschion to consider how Moschion’s new plan would hurt them both:

οὐ δικάϊως ἡτιτῶσάμην τί σε·  
 ἡγνόησ’, ἥμαρτον, ἐμάνην. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο .[  
 εἷς γε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀμαρτῶν σοῦ πρόνοιαν ἡλίκην  
 ἔσχον, <ἐν> ἐμαυτῶι τ’ ἐτήρουν τοῦθ’ ὃ δὴ ποτ’ ἡγνόουν·  
 οὐχὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἔθηκα φανερόν ἐπιχαίρειν· σὺ δὲ  
 τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαρτίαν νῦν ἐκφέρεις καὶ μάρτυρας  
 ἐπ’ ἐμὲ τῆς ἐμῆς ἀνοίας λαμβάνεις· οὐκ ἄξιῶ,  
 Μοσχίων. (702–9)

I blamed you unjustly. I was ignorant; I made a mistake; I was being crazy. But [heed(?)] this. When I acted badly towards others, I held so much caution for you, and what misapprehensions I had I tried to keep<sup>64</sup> to myself: I did not set [my mistakes] out clearly for my enemies to rejoice [over them]. But you now exhibit my mistake and make witnesses against me in my ignorance. I do not think this is right, Moschion.

Demeas speaks about his reputation in Athens and specifically how Moschion harms it by broadcasting Demeas’ folly. If he goes abroad, Moschion will make public that he and Demeas had some sort of disagreement that split up their household. Whereas Nikeratos sought to overcome (hypothetical) *aischunē* by publicizing his (hypothetical) just response to it, Demeas seeks to obscure the entire situation from public view, so as not to incur *aischunē* on anyone involved. Hofmesiter (1997: 334 n.21) calls this Demeas’ “fetish of secrecy,” and emphasizes Demeas’ desire to hide what might cause *aischunē* as a mark of both his personal psychology and his social class.

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<sup>64</sup> A conative imperfect, given that Demeas did not succeed in keeping his suspicions to himself, as Sommerstein (2012: 310) points out.

The key detail in this scene is that Moschion's actions will not make plain any specific misdeed, only some existing familial strife, and such a rift is enough to harm Demeas' reputation as a father. In other words, Demeas explains how reputation is more a function of appearances than misdeeds: the family's affairs, however confusing and confused they might have been, were settled and all has been forgiven. If their existence became public, however, Moschion would tarnish his family's reputation and—one can reasonably assume—cause *aischunē* for Demeas. Perhaps if Demeas were a less mild mannered father, he would have simply stated that Moschion, in wanting to go abroad, brought *aischunē* upon his household.

Menander's *Samia* is a play exploring a father-son relationship and the difficulties both characters have with loving others properly. As such, it is fitting that the majority of the expressions of *aischunē* in the play illuminate father-son dynamics and sexual propriety. *Samia* helps us to see how concerns of citizenship, masculinity, courage and sexual mores can all drive a character to feel *aischunē*, and implies that different social classes have different ways of managing their *aischunē*.

### CHAPTER 3: *aischunē* in *Dyskolos*

Menander's *Dyskolos* tells the story of young Sostratos, whom the god Pan compels to fall in love with the daughter of the misanthrope Knemon. Its text is more complete than *Samia*'s, but also less directly concerned with *aischunē*. Over the course of the play's thousand lines, *aischunē* is an issue only four times, but each instance is worth dissecting because each is so different from the examples in *Samia*. Three of the four instances of the concept, for example, describe women's felt *aischunē*, which was wholly absent in *Samia*. *aischunē* in *Dyskolos* also concerns a brother/sister relationship, as opposed to the father/son dynamic of *Samia*, as well as proper conduct at a feast. First we ought to consider the plot as a whole.

Knemon, whose infamous temper gives the play its title, lives with his daughter (referred to in the play only as *Korē*, "Girl") and his slave Simiche near a shrine of Pan and far away from any neighbors. Before the play's action, Knemon had married a widow, who already had a son named Gorgias. After bearing Girl, the widow fled Knemon's house to escape her new husband's ire, and lived with her son Gorgias and his slave Daos.

Pan delivers the play's prologue, in which he describes its complex familial relationships, and then Sostratos enters, already starstruck by the sight of Girl. Sostratos had sent his slave Pyhrrias to talk with Knemon about a possible wedding, and is discussing his love with another friend when Pyhrrias returns with news of Knemon's fury. Knemon apparently attacked Pyhrrias without any provocation, and Pyhrrias is understandably eager to run away!

Knemon then comes onstage for his first rant: he longs to be alone and away from human companionship and wishes everyone would just leave him be. Knemon upbraids Sostratos for being present and then storms off, leaving Sostratos alone for Girl's first entrance. She comes onstage lamenting that her family nurse dropped their bucket in the well. She is

terrified that Knemon will beat her for the mistake, when Sostratos offers to get more water for her.

Gorgias, Girl's half-brother, hears that Sostratos helped her via his slave Daos. He initially is furious that someone seems to be furtively courting his sister and reprimands Daos for not stopping Sostratos. After Gorgias meets Sostratos, however, he sees that Sostratos truly loves Girl and wants to wed her (and he sees that Sostratos is wealthy<sup>65</sup>) and so agrees to help Sostratos win over Knemon and marry Girl. Because Knemon has vowed that Girl will not wed unless they find a groom with a personality just like his own,<sup>66</sup> Gorgias has Sostratos try his hand at farming to prove that he can work hard, while Sostratos' family and the cook Sikon progress to the shrine of Pan to make sacrifices. A number of characters try to approach Knemon for aid in inconsequential ways, and he responds with verbal and physical abuse, until his slave Simiche drops an important farming tool in the well and Knemon falls in trying to retrieve it.

At the play's pivotal moment, Gorgias jumps in the well to save his step-father while Sostratos stands by and admires Girl. Sostratos then pulls up the rope to help Gorgias, and Knemon, having faced death and been saved by the selfless aid of another, experiences a change of heart. He tells Gorgias to arrange a marriage for Girl, and Gorgias excitedly introduces Sostratos. Sostratos then convinces his wealthy father Kallipides to approve two weddings: Sostratos will marry Girl, and Gorgias will marry Sostratos' sister (unnamed). Sostratos' family throws a feast to celebrate the double-marriages, which Knemon refuses to attend. The cook Sikon and slave Getas harass Knemon and trick him into attending the party, and the play concludes.

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<sup>65</sup> For more on the importance of Sostratos' class in Gorgias' decision to help, see Rosivach (2001) and Hofmeister (1997).

<sup>66</sup> Traill (2008: 50-6) writes on the strange social dynamics of Knemon's reclusive nature and his unwillingness to let his daughter wed. Girl is (51) "not allowed to grow up."

The first instance of *aischunē* in *Dyskolos* occurs when Girl first enters. She needs water for her father, but the slave Simiche has dropped the bucket into the well, and she hesitates to get water from religious worshippers. Sostratos hides and listens as Girl speaks to herself thus:

ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτ' αἴσθητ', ἀπολεῖ κακ[  
παίων ἐκείνην. οὐ σχολή ματ[  
ὦ φίλταται Νύμφαι, παρ' ὑμῶν λη[πτέον.  
**αἰσχύνομαι** μέν, εἴ τινες θύουσ' ἄ[ρα  
ἔνδον, **ἐνοχλεῖν**— (195–9)

If he (Knemon) hears this, he'll beat and strike her (Simiche) bad[ly (?)]. No time for [(?)]. Oh blessed Nymphs, you must supply us water. [But] if people are sacrificing within, **I feel *aischunē* to interfere** ...

As in *Samia* 27, *aischunō* in the middle is used with an infinitive, here *enochlein* (to trouble or annoy), to express what a character would feel *aischunē* to do, and hence what they refrain from doing. In this passage Girl does not want to interrupt religious worshippers, and her *aischunē* acts as a prohibitory guide to action, stopping her from fetching the water her father asked for.<sup>67</sup> She may also feel something of her father's unsociability,<sup>68</sup> or, she may simply be reluctant to approach men outside of her family—although her apparent comfort around Sostratos and readiness to accept his aid call the latter reading into question (or, potentially, signals her attraction for him). Regardless, Sostratos apparently feels no such *aischunē* and happily runs in to fetch water for her.

Girl is exceptional in the Menandrian corpus: she is one of only two female characters who explicitly reference their *aischunē*,<sup>69</sup> but, uniquely, she does so when speaking to herself as

<sup>67</sup> As Handley (1965: 166) notes, “αἰσχύνομαι expresses appropriate modesty and reverence: it would be wrong, she feels, to disturb anyone actually making an offering simply in order to get her water.”

<sup>68</sup> As Traill (2008: 55) points out, *enochlein* is not the most common verb, and is only otherwise uttered by “Daos, Getas, Sikon and of course Knemon.”

<sup>69</sup> The other is Glykera in the *Perikeiromene*. Glykera has embraced her brother Moschion, whom few others know is actually her brother, and with whom many suspect she has had illicit relations. She delivers a series of rhetorical counter-factual questions to explain her behavior (708–19) to her father (who likely does not yet know that he is her father). If she had done what he suspected, she asks (717), wouldn't that have meant that she “feels no *aischunē*?” She is *not* saying that she chose to act in a certain way because she felt *aischunē*; rather she is using her reputation as

a way of thinking through her options. In other words, she is singular in that she is the only woman who explicitly weighs the *aischunē* of an action to make a decision about what to do. She conceives of her place in the world with respect to *aischunē*, and hesitates to act because of her sense of *aischunē*.

Girl, alongside *Perikeiromene*'s Glykera, offers us a glimpse into the way that *aischunē* shapes the action of Menander's women as well as the men, although in Girl's case, it is difficult to tell how gender comes into play specifically. Besides the simple fact that women *do* have access to *aischunē*, these lines do not reveal much about women's *aischunē*. Interrupting a religious procedure presumably would cause a man to hesitate as much as a woman. While it is true Sostratos has no qualms about interrupting an offering, one must recall that Sostratos is a young man wracked by love and liable to go to great lengths to win Girl. He is not a good model of masculine *aischunē*, which leaves us without a point of comparison for Girl's actions.<sup>70</sup> Perhaps the basic fact of her ability to feel and express *aischunē* is the best testament to the emotion's flexibility and power.

It is likewise difficult to determine if Girl's hesitation to act is based on a fear of harming her reputation in her community, given that she lives with an infamous misanthrope, at a significant distance from others. It seems more likely that she believes that impeding religious rites or customs is a transgressive act in itself, regardless of any consequences for her reputation. Thus she must weigh the consequences of interrupting worshippers against displeasing her

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an upstanding woman (one with a proper sense of *aischunē*) to convince another character that she had not acted in a certain way.

<sup>70</sup> Kiritsi (2013: 90–1) points out, somewhat paradoxically, that in running in to fetch water for Girl, Sostratos actually exhibits a remarkable amount of self-control and restraint: “though the wealthy young man in love is given the opportunity to take advantage of the young girl during their encounter in an isolated place, a narrative situation loaded with erotic potential (a scenario realized in numerous mythic archetypes and tragic and comic plots, for example Menander's own *Epitrepontes*), nonetheless he exercises self-control, limiting himself to extolling her beauty (191–93) and helping her to fill her jar with water from the spring (197–99).” Thus in Kiritsi's reading, impeding the religious rituals is not even a transgression worth noting.

father. As in *Samia* 27, a vague translation of the emotion may be the most productive for the stage (e.g. “If people are sacrificing in there, I don’t want to interrupt ...”); in a classroom, however, I would want to emphasize Girl’s access to what seems to be a primarily masculine emotional repertoire and thus translate “I’d feel guilty to interrupt someone sacrificing in there ...”

The next scene to be analyzed provides more insight into the way *aischunē* shaped women’s lives and also draws the outlines of a proper sibling relationship, of familial *aischunē*. Gorgias, Girl’s half-brother, believes that Sostratos is secretly and illegitimately courting Girl. Gorgias reprimands Daos for not accosting or stopping Sostratos:

ἔδει σε, νῆ Δία,  
τὸν τῇ κόρη προσιόντα, <Δᾶ>, ὅστις ποτ’ ἦν,  
ιδεῖν τότ’ εὐθύς, τοῦτο τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου  
εἰπεῖν θ’ ὅπως μηδεὶς ποτ’ αὐτὸν ὄψεται  
ποιοῦντα· νυνὶ δ’ ὥσπερ ἀλλοτρίου τινὸς  
πράγματος ἀπέστης. οὐκ ἔνεστ’ ἴσως φυγεῖν  
οἰκειότητα, Δᾶ’ ἀδελφῆς· ἔτι μέλει  
ἡμῖ[ν].<sup>71</sup> ὁ πατήρ ἀλλότριος εἶναι βούλεται  
αὐτῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς· μὴ τὸ τούτου δύσκολον  
μιμώμεθ’ ἡμεῖς· ὅν γὰρ αἰσχύνῃ τινὶ  
**αὐτῇ] περιπέσει**, τοῦτο κάμοι γίνεται  
ὄνειδο]ς. ὁ γὰρ ἔξωθεν οὐ τὸν αἴτιον  
ὅστις] πότ’ ἐστὶν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γεγονός. (234–46)

By Zeus, you should have seen the man accosting the girl right away, whoever he was, and you should have told him not to let anyone ever see him doing that in the future. But instead, like it was someone else’s business, you stood aside. It’s not right, I suppose, to run away from family ties with a sister, Daos.<sup>72</sup> We’re still responsible.<sup>73</sup> Her father may want to keep away from us, but let’s not copy his misanthropy: **if [she] falls into some *aischunē***, the [disgrace/blame] would also be on me. For an outsider doesn’t know who is responsible, only what happened.

<sup>71</sup> Arnott (1997) prints ἡμῖ[ν]; Sandbach (1990) prints ἐμῇ[ς].

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Balme and Brown (2001: 12), “I suppose we can’t escape the duty owed our kin;” and Arnott (1997: 219), “you can’t escape from blood ties with a sister, I don’t think.”

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Handley (1965: 177), who also reads ἐμῇ[ς]: “I am still concerned for my sister.”



The issue here, as in almost every case of *aischunē* in *Samia*, is sexual decorum. In this case, *aischunēi tini*, “some shame,” is a euphemism that allows Gorgias to establish the stakes without making explicit the crime: he is worried that some city-slicker has come to seduce or assault his sister. Rather than naming Sostratos’ misconduct, Gorgias pointedly gestures toward it as a source of *aischunē* both for his sister and for himself.<sup>74</sup> This is the first extant example of the noun *aischunē* in Menander, and there will only be one more instance (952). It is clear that *aischunē* here does not denote an emotion, but rather a state or circumstance which might cause an emotion. Gorgias is not worried that his sister might feel *aischunē*, but rather that she fall into a reputation-damaging circumstance which might in turn cause him to feel *aischunē*.

Gorgias’ primary concern here is about appearances. When he chides Daos for not intervening, he employs verbs of seeing, *idein* (236) and *opsetai* (237), and explicitly says that Daos should have “told [Sostratos] not to let anyone ever *see him doing that* in the future.” Gorgias never says that Sostratos’ actions were transgressive in themselves, but only bad in how they look and how they make Gorgias look.<sup>75</sup> At least in Gorgias’ telling, Girl’s potential *aischunē* is negative in how it affects their reputation, not in itself.

As in 195-9, these lines concern a woman’s *aischunē*. The parallels to Moschion’s *aischunē* in *Samia* are clear: *aischunē* for Girl, just as for Moschion, comes as a result of sexual

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<sup>74</sup> Gorgias never names the crime explicitly. The closest he comes is when he speaks to Sostratos thus:

ἔργον δοκεῖς μοι φαῦλον ἐξηλωκέσαι,  
 πείσειν νομίζων ἐξαμαρτεῖν παρθένον  
 ἐλευθέραν, ἢ καιρὸν ἐπιτηρῶν τινα  
 κατεργάσασθαι πρᾶγμα θανάτων ἄξιον  
 πολλῶν, (289-92)

“You seem to me to strive for a vile deed, thinking you’d persuade a young free girl to err or looking for a chance to do a deed worthy of multiple deaths!”

<sup>75</sup> Handley (1965: 176), however, translates, “... and told him to be sure that no-one ever catches him doing that in the future.” While this still emphasizes *being caught* rather than doing something wrong, I do not want to draw too sharp a distinction between the two different expressions. In colloquial English, “don’t let me catch you doing that” puts as much stress on an action-as-misbehavior as it does on being seen doing the action; perhaps Gorgias’ expression works similarly. Regardless, he still speaks in terms of appearances.

misbehavior. Again, it is significant simply that Girl has honor to lose, even if, in Gorgias' telling, she seems to have no agency: Gorgias strongly implies that if he does not act, Girl will have no defenses against Sostratos' seduction.

But it is not only Girl's reputation at stake here. Gorgias wants to protect his sister and do what is right by her, but stresses that this is because he wants to protect his own reputation. His repute is entwined with hers, and so, as far as Gorgias is concerned, Daos should have stopped Sostratos because his masters' reputation was at stake. The family ties (242 *oikeiotēta*) to which Gorgias refers bind him to his sister (242 *adelphēs*), even if Gorgias and Girl do not share a household or a father. Gorgias must therefore consider himself partially responsible for his sister's actions, and if he could be blamed for her misbehavior, then logically his community likewise considers him responsible. But with his closing remark, "an outsider doesn't know who is responsible, only what happened," Gorgias implies that he does not think he should be held responsible. Taken with the disparagement of his step-father Knemon (243–4), it is clear that Gorgias blames Knemon for not taking better care of Girl. When Gorgias spurs Daos onto action, he does so to combat Knemon's failure as a father as much as to stop Sostratos' advances. Even though Gorgias does not live with Knemon or Girl, his honor and reputation in his community rely on theirs; thus, if Knemon fails to protect his daughter and she falls into some *aischunē*, Gorgias' stature is diminished.<sup>76</sup>

Revising my earlier translation of 243-5 is difficult because *oneidos* (245) is an uncertain reconstruction, and its rendering relies on one's reading of *aischunē*. *oneidos* could be translated as "blame" or "reproach," or as the effect of being blamed, i.e. "disgrace" or "dishonor." It does

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<sup>76</sup> Traill (2008: 53): "Whereas her father demonstrates a dispositional and physical incapacity for the role of *kyrios*, her stepbrother fulfills the essential responsibilities without recognition or legal sanction (Sostratos still talks of negotiating with Knemon even while he is asking Gorgias for her hand, 305-6)."

not express an emotion, but rather an action (censuring someone) or the resulting loss of status from that action. How one reads *oneidos* here relies on how one chooses to interpret *aischunē*, and I thus translate: “if she falls into some dishonor, the blame will also be on me.”

Much later in the play, after Sostratos’ wedding to Girl and Gorgias’ wedding to Sostratos’ sister have been confirmed, Sostratos’ family throws a party at the shrine of Pan. Both of the play’s remaining instances of *aischunē* relate to women at the party. First, Gorgias expresses to his soon-to-be-brother-in-law that he is too shy to attend because there are girls present:

<Σω> ἡμεῖς δ’ ἴωμεν.  
 (Γο) Σώστραθ’, ὑπεραισχύνομαι  
 γυναιξὶν ἐν ταῦτῳ—  
 (Σω) τίς ὁ λῆρος; οὐ πρόει;  
 οἰκεῖα ταῦτ’ ἤδη νομίζειν πάντα δεῖ. (871–3)

S: Let’s go [into the party].

G: Sostratos, **I feel great *aischunē*** in the same room with women—

S: What nonsense! Why don’t you go on in? Now, you need to remember that they are all family.

In this instance, *aischunō* takes the preface *hyper-* to emphasize the *aischunē* felt.<sup>77</sup> Sostratos cuts off Gorgias in mid-speech,<sup>78</sup> so we must infer Gorgias means that he feels great *aischunē* to be in the same room with these women. There are two likely sources of discomfort: the first is the presence of women generally and possibly Gorgias’ new wife specifically; the second is the class difference between Sostratos and Gorgias. Both could make Gorgias anxious, as the text

<sup>77</sup> An exceedingly rare compound, which shows up only 8 other times according to the *TLG*. This is the only usage of *hyperaischunomai* in extant Athenian comedy, apart from one in a fragment of the *Psaltria*, a Middle Comedy by Dromo (fourth century).

<sup>78</sup> Or Gorgias simply stops talking, perhaps because of his intense feeling.

implies that Gorgias has not been to an event like this party before.<sup>79</sup> His hesitation contrasts sharply with Sostratos' self-assurance.

Even though the prefix *hyper-* emphasizes what Gorgias feels, this instance of *aischunē* is trivial and trivialized compared to the other Menandrian examples: it takes one line for Sostratos to convince Gorgias to enter the party and all hesitation and embarrassment are then forgotten. Gorgias here feels *aischunē* as a personal emotion, which, while it does initially inhibit him from going to the party, seems rather disconnected from any serious moral or social transgression.

Alternatively, one could read Gorgias' *hyper-aischunē* as an ironic overstatement. He could very well not feel *aischunē* at all in this exchange and instead by over-stating possible *aischunē* to hide his actual excitement to go into the party. Either way, 871-2 would be played for laughs: either we laugh at Gorgias for feelings unnecessarily shy or we laugh at him for pretending to be shy when he is actually excited. Thus I translate 871-2: "Sostratos, I'm really shy around women—" and, then I imagine Sostratos cutting Gorgias off. A play's director or Gorgias' actor would have to decide if this is an ironical statement or not.

The final scene I will analyze explores *aischunē* as a woman's modesty or "sense of shame." In the play's finale, Sostratos' slave Getas and cook Sikon harass Knemon and force him to join the party. As they pester Knemon, Sikon describes how the party is going:

καί τις βραχεῖσα προσπόλων εὐήλικος προσώπου  
ἄνθος κατεσκιασμένη χορεῖον εἰσέβαινε  
ῥυθμὸν μετ' αἰσχύνῃς ὁμοῦ μέλλουσα <καὶ> τρέμουσα,  
ἄλλη δὲ συγκαθῆπτε ταύτῃ χεῖρα κἀχόρευεν. (950–3)

And a girl, tipsy, one of the servants, having covered up the bloom  
of her young face, stepped into a rhythmic dance, [but] **with**

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<sup>79</sup> Handley (1965: 280) notes, "as a countryman, Gorgias has something of Knemon's instinctive unsocialability [sic]. A party of this kind, with ladies present, is something outside of his experience, and in his rustic *diphthera* he will look out of place too."

*aischunē*, at the same time hesitating and trembling, and another girl joined hands with her and danced.

Sikon describes the girl as dancing *met' aischunēs* (“with *aischunē*”) to mean with modesty or a sense of shame.<sup>80</sup> One can glean something of expectations of femininity from this passage—that there are certain acceptable and unacceptable ways for women to dance in public—but what Sikon makes most clear is the importance of a veiled face.<sup>81</sup> Just as feeling *aischunē* causes characters to want to hide their faces and cover themselves, so too does hiding one’s face exhibit a proper sense of *aischunē*. There is a metaphorical consistency in the action: the dancer shows off her sense of *aischunē* (her decorum or modesty) by hiding her face; if she had instead danced with abandon and incurred *aischunē* (shame or guilt), she would have wanted to hide her face after the fact.<sup>82</sup>

One could, however, read this *aischunē*, much like Gorgias’ above, as a sort of trivial bashfulness. Perhaps the dancer has veiled her face not because it would be inappropriate not to, but simply because she is shy. In each case the veil is paramount as a tool of self-protection. Either it wards off a bad reputation for dancing inappropriately, or it masks the dancer’s shy start. Sikon suggests the latter motive in the last line of his account, when a second dancer joins the first. We do not know if dancer #2 acts *met' aischunēs*; we do not know if she is veiled or trembling; we know only that she takes the first dancer’s hand and joins in the dance. This seems to suggest that the first dancer’s *aischunē* was not a “sense of shame,” but rather bashfulness or

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. *Epitrepontes* 795-6, where Smikrines describes a prostitute as acting with no *aischunē* whatsoever, no sense of shame.

<sup>81</sup> As Handley (1965: 302) notes, “we may imagine her wearing a veil or head-scarf” as a marker of her *aischunē*. Compare *Perikeiromene* 311, in which Moschion says his mother will feel *aischunē* and “she’ll hide her face, for that’s quite normal.”

<sup>82</sup> Cairns (2016) discusses the importance of considering metaphorical expressions of emotion in understanding how they were felt. He cites expressions of *aidôs*, the feeling, as like a garment or veil which covers one in shame/guilt (22). In this case, rather than a veil of *aischunē* covering over a person, we see how a veil can protect one from incurring *aischunē*.

shyness. Thus I translate this section: “One of the young girls, a bit tipsy, but still shy, covered her pretty face and started to dance, hesitating and trembling until another girl joined hands with her and danced along.”

Menander’s *Dyskolos* helps to expand our understanding of *aischunē* in new contexts and situations, particularly with regard to women’s *aischunē*. It is clear from the examples at hand that the female characters represented did not have access to the depth and breadth of *aischunē* that their male counterparts enjoyed, either as an emotion or a dispositional state, but they were not entirely cut off from *aischunē* either. Girl feels *aischunē*, the emotion, as a restrictive force and Gorgias expresses how his *aischunē*, his reputation, is linked to his half-sister’s. The final two instances are comparatively trivial and show how *aischunē* could weigh on a subject lightly or heavily.

## CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I extended the work of historians of emotion to the under-unexplored genre of New Comedy to discuss the configuration and representation of *aischunē* in Menander's *Samia* and *Dyskolos*. While *aischunē* is more than an emotion, it was necessary first to lay out our understanding of an "emotion" as a concept and then to establish which modern emotions have the most overlap with Menandrian *aischunē*. With the supposition that a character's understanding of their own context, behavior, and action directly affects how they experience emotion, I then traced out the scenes in Menander's *Samia* and *Dyskolos* in which characters felt or explained their *aischunē* to better understand how it functions as a construct.

It is my hope that more research and emotion-based inquiry will follow and continue to mine the rich depths of comedy for meaning. One potential avenue of further study could investigate Menander's Euripidean influences and could make up the basis of a comparative study of emotional representation in tragedy and comedy.<sup>83</sup> A comparative analysis of Menander's emotional palette *vis-à-vis* his Roman adaptors Plautus and Terence would likewise be fertile ground, especially to those interested in translating emotion across time and place. When the Roman comedians adapted their Greek predecessors, how did they interpret and represent the emotions they found in the earlier plays? Either of these proposed studies could function like this thesis, taking one emotion-term as their baseline and analyzing its variable representations, or they could work "backwards," so to speak, and try and trace all the different ways a modern emotion (like "shame" or "fear") might manifest itself in an ancient author.

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<sup>83</sup> Euripides' influence on New Comedy in general and Menander in particular has long been noted. For an overview of the development of New Comedy plots, see Lowe (2000: 188-221), and Walton and Arnott (1996: 1-20).

*aischunē* might not precisely map on to our idea of shame, guilt, embarrassment, honor, pride, or humiliation, but its essential foreignness does not render it unknowable: by exploring how *aischunē* manifested itself, how it was represented and conceived of, we can come closer to understanding the interplay of feelings and thoughts that constitute it. *aischunē* is a peculiarly Greek way of visualizing the world, the foundation of interior moral codes and external social pressure. It involves a normalizing expression of masculinity and a confirmation of social hierarchies just as it is an ethical code and source of personal morals. It dictates the ways brothers should treat their sisters and fathers their sons; it describes how one should dance at a party and talk to one's neighbors.

In this thesis, I compared *aischunē* with contemporary English expressions of shame, guilt, and embarrassment, and, in each instance of the concept in Menander's *Samia* and *Dyskolos*, I argued for a different translation to better convey complexities of meaning. I tried to take into account different possible uses for a translation of ancient comedy, whether it be for a classroom or the stage, but always focused primarily on how to best explicate *aischunē* in the lines translated. With more surveys like this one, our conception of the abstract emotions of antiquity—and our figuring of our own abstracts—can be illuminated ever further. Careful deconstruction of the relics of antiquity can guide us to a fuller understanding of the Greeks' emotional world, and, in turn, cast light upon our own obscure emotional constructs.



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